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Property of the Bankruptcy Estate
After a Conversion from
Chapter 13 to Chapter 7:
The Need for a Definite Answer
ROBERT J. VOLPI*
[I]t was not the design of the Bankruptcy laws to allow the Debtor to
lead the life of Riley while his creditors suffer on his behalf.'
INTRODUCTION
In recent years the number of Americans who have declared personal
bankruptcy has grown phenomenally.2 Indeed, despite all of the publicity
given to large corporations filing for bankruptcy, the vast majority of
bankruptcies involve nonbusiness debtors.3 Most of these bankruptcies are
Chapter 7 liquidations,4 and it is estimated that the total amount of
noncollectible debt resulting from Chapter 7 discharges runs into billions
of dollars annually.' The cost of this is first borne by the creditor but is
eventually passed on to consumers in the form of higher interest rates,
greater difficulty in obtaining credit, and higher prices for goods and
services.
* J.D. Candidate, 1993, Indiana University School of Law at Bloomington; B.S., 1990, State
University of New York at Binghamton.
1. In re Bryant, 47 B.R. 21, 26 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1984).
2. During a recent six-year period the number grew by 152%, from 285,000 in 1984 to 718,000 in
1990. Iver Peterson, Americans Confront the Debt the House Built, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 11, 1991, § 4, at
5. Since 1991 and 1992 were recession years, this trend will very likely continue.
3. Mark E. Roszkowski, Good Faith and Chapter 13 Plans Providing for Debts Nondischargeable
Under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Proposal to Assure Rehabilitation, Not Liquidation, 46
Bus. LAW. 68, 69 (1990). In 1988, nonbusiness bankruptcies comprised approximately 88% of all
bankruptcy filings. Id. at n.10 (citing ANNuAL REPORT OF THE DnR~croR OF THE ADmINSTRATiVE
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COuRTS 31 (1988)).
4. For example, in 1988 approximately 71% of all bankruptcy cases (both business and nonbusiness)
were liquidations under Chapter 7. Id. Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code is entitled "Liquidation." I 1
U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1988). For a discussion of how Chapter 7 works, see infra notes 18-21 and
accompanying text.
5. See S. REP. No. 446, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1982).
6. Irving A. Breitowitz, New Developments in Consumer Bankruptcies: Chapter 7 Dismissal on the
Basis of "Substantial Abuse," 59 AM. BANKR. L.J. 327, 339 (1985).
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Congress enacted Chapter 137 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19788
to encourage the honest but unfortunate debtor to make greater use of
"composition with creditors" in bankruptcy.9 Chapter 13 allows debtors
to retain the property necessary to achieve a fresh start and to avoid the
stigma of a Chapter 7 liquidation by permitting them to repay their
creditors over a longer period of time.'0 Creditors prefer Chapter 13 over
Chapter 71 because they tend to receive a higher return, 2 although it
is spread over a longer period of time. Thus, debtors should be
encouraged to file under Chapter 13.
While Chapter 13 benefits creditors, it is not always the best choice for
the debtor. Therefore, a substantial number of debtors who attempt a
Chapter 13 plan eventually convert to a Chapter 7 liquidation. 3 This
Note addresses the problem of what happens when a debtor is unable to
satisfactorily complete his Chapter 13 plan and must convert to Chapter 7.
In particular, this Note analyzes one of the most troublesome questions
that arises during a conversion from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7: Is property
acquired by the debtor after he has filed under Chapter 13 included in the
Chapter 7 estate' 4 upon conversion?
Part I of this Note provides background with respect to this problem.
Part I first presents a brief overview of Chapters 7 and 13 and then
7. Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act is entitled "Adjustment Of Debts Of An Individual
With Regular Income." 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330.
8. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988). The terms "Code" and "Bankruptcy Code" are used throughout
this Note to refer to this Act.
9. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 116 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6076. A "composition with creditors" is an agreement between an insolvent debtor and his creditors,
whereby the creditors agree to accept a payment that is less than the whole amount of their claims, to
be distributed pro rata, in discharge and satisfaction of the whole. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 286 (6th
ed. 1990).
10. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 9, at 118, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6079. For a
more detailed discussion on how Chapter 13 works, see infra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
11. Laura A. Pawloski, The Debtor Trap: The Ironies of Section 707(a), 7 BANKR. DEv. J. 175, 178
(1990).
12. This derives from the fact that in 90% of Chapter 7 cases, no assets are available for
distribution. See H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 65, pt. 1 (1973). In contrast, it is mandatory
in a Chapter 13 case that all disposable income over the period of the plan be included in the property
of the estate and be used to satisfy debts. See II U.S.C. § 1322.
The following example illustrates a circumstance in which a creditor would prefer Chapter 13 over
Chapter 7: "A debtor who recently graduated from professional school would typically have few
valuable assets but high earning potential. In this situation, a creditor would obviously want the debtor
in Chapter 13 because it could mean the difference between receiving nothing or full payment."
Pawloski, supra note 11, at 178 n.22.
13. 2 KEITH M. LUNDIN, CHAPTER 13 BANKRUPTCY § 8.5 (1990).
14. The bankruptcy estate is "the aggregation of [the debtor's] property rights which can be
administered by the court in a bankruptcy case." HENRY J. SOMMER, CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY LAW
AND PRACTICE 51 (3d ed. 1988).
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illustrates the problem by using the case In re Lybrook15 as an example.
Part II examines arguments based on the language and policies behind
various sections of the Bankruptcy Code. Part III examines arguments
based upon the broad policy considerations underlying the Code. Finally,
this Note suggests amendments to the Code that Congress should adopt in
order to make it easier for courts to determine what property should be
included in the converted bankruptcy estate and to eradicate the problem
of bad faith conversions.
I. CONVERSION FROM CHAPTER 13 TO CHAPTER 7: AN OVERVIEW
A. How Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 Work
For an individual debtor, the Bankruptcy Code basically provides two
alternative types of relief.' 6 liquidation under Chapter 7 or reorganization
under Chapter 13. These two chapters of the Code are "fundamentally"
different from each other. 7 Chapter 7 is the remedy available for debtors
who are either "unable or unwilling to repay their obligations."8 That
choice involves the surrender to a trustee of all the debtor's nonexempt
assets' 9 in which the debtor has equity. The trustee attempts to sell the
property20 and distributes any proceeds to the creditors according to
certain statutory rules. The debtor gives up the property hoping to obtain
a discharge that will relieve him from further personal liability for his
pre-bankruptcy debts.2'
In contrast, Chapter 13 deals with debtor rehabilitation rather than a
liquidation of the debtor's assets.2 2 In a Chapter 13 case, the debtor
proposes a plan for repayment of some or all of his debts, within certain
statutory guidelines. The plan is then carried out under court supervision
with the court protecting the debtor, and usually all of the debtor's
15. Robb v. Lybrook (In re Lybrook), 107 B.R. 611 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989), aftd, 135 B.R. 321
(N.D. Ind. 1990), aft'd, 951 F.2d 136 (7th Cir. 1991).
16. "Courts are divided about whether individuals may also obtain relief under Chapter 11."
SOMMER, supra note 14, at 47 n.4.
17. Hannan v. Kirschenbaum (In re Hannan), 24 B.R. 691, 692 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982).
18. In re Silva, 82 B.R. 845, 846 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987).
19. Section 522 provides that certain assets of the debtor are exempted from the bankruptcy estate
and are protected from the reach of creditors. These assets are referred to as "exempt assets." I 1 U.S.C.
§ 522 (1988).
20. Unfortunately for creditors, liquidation often realizes a value far lower than fair market due to
the "forced sale" nature of the liquidation. In re Silva, 82 B.R. at 846.
21. DAVID G. EPSTEIN, DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW IN A NUTSHELL, 141 (3d ed. 1985).
22. Id. at 142.
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property, from creditors. Chapter 13 works on the assumption that the
debtor's plan of repayment will be funded by his future earnings.23
Therefore the Code requires the submission of "such portion of future
earnings or other future income of the debtor to the supervision and
control of the trustee as is necessary for the execution of the plan.
24
The trustee then distributes these funds to the creditors. In return for this
submission, the debtor retains possession of his property, whether or not
it becomes part of the bankruptcy estate. 25 At the end of the plan, which
lasts between three and five years, the debtor gets a discharge that is more
favorable than the one available under Chapter 7.26
The ability to retain property under Chapter 13 provides a strong
incentive for a debtor to choose that alternative over Chapter 7. By
comparison, a Chapter 7 case requires any nonexempt property to be
turned over to the trustee for liquidation. Thus, Chapter 13 is most
attractive to a debtor who has valuable assets that he wants to protect
from his creditors.
Some see in Chapter 13 a quid pro quo: in exchange for the advantages
that the debtor receives under Chapter 13, he owes the creditors a duty to
proceed fairly.
[R]emedies under the Bankruptcy Code are designed in the alternative.
Debtors are given a choice of either a reorganizational process, which
preserves the going concern value of assets, or liquidation by a
trustee .... The provisions of [the reorganization] chapters generally
permit debtors to retain assets, to restructure most secured debts, and
to repay obligations over an extended period of time. In return for
those powers and rights, it is expected that the debtors' reorganization
plans will attempt to preserve interests and offer at least partial
repayment of all obligations, including unsecured debts. Such plans
must also deal fairly with all creditors.28
Unfortunately, many debtors encounter problems of different sorts that
make it difficult for them to complete their Chapter 13 plans. For
example, unemployment, illness, unexpected expenses, or marital problems
can impair the debtor's ability to continue making plan payments.2 9 One
option open to the debtor who cannot continue under Chapter 13 is
23. See H.R. REp. No. 595, supra note 9, at 119, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6079-80.
24. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(1) (1988).
25. See id. § 1327(b).
26. In re Silva, 82 B.R. 845, 846 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987).
27. See I 1 U.S.C. § 541.
28. In re Silva, 82 B.R. at 846.
29. SOMMER, supra note 14, at 107.
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conversion to Chapter 7. Section 1307 of the Code provides that the
debtor can convert his case at any time and that the right to convert
cannot be waived.30
B. The Problem: In re Lybrook
Although conversion is a simple procedure, problems can arise in
reconciling the new Chapter 7 proceeding with the former one under
Chapter 13, particularly because the property of the bankruptcy estate is
defined differently under each Chapter. 31 The case of In re Lybrook
32
provides an excellent example of these problems.
Daniel and Linda Lou Lybrook operated a modest farm in northern
Indiana. On March 24, 1986, Mr. and Mrs. Lybrook filed a petition for
relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code.33 However, the
Lybrooks were never able to obtain confirmation of their Chapter 13
plan.34 Consequently, after fifteen months, in June, 1987, the case was
converted to Chapter 7.31 "This scenario would not be extraordinary but
for the fact that debtors' financial position changed dramatically between
the date they sought relief under Chapter 13 and the date of conversion
to Chapter 7."36 Between these two dates, on January 17, 1987, Mr.
Lybrook's father died unexpectedly, and Mr. Lybrook, who had been
recently included in his father's will, inherited assets valued in excess of
$70,000."
30. "The debtor may convert a case under [chapter 13] to a case under chapter 7 of this title at any
time." 11 U.S.C. § 1307(a). In addition, § 1307(c)(3) provides that "on request of a party in interest or
the United States trustee ... the court may convert a case under this chapter [13] to a case under
chapter 7 .... or may dismiss a case under this chapter [13]. . . , whichever is in the best interests of
creditors and the estate, for cause, including... failure to file a plan timely .... Id. § 1307(c)(3).
31. For a discussion of property of the estate, see infra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
32. Robb v. Lybrook (In re Lybrook), 107 B.R. 611, (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989), afJd, 135 B.R. 321
(N.D. Ind. 1990), aff'd, 951 F.2d 136 (7th Cir. 1991).
33. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330.
34. This Note does not address how confirmation of the Chapter 13 plan affects the bankruptcy
estate. Some courts have held that, unless the plan provides otherwise, confirmation vests all the
property of the Chapter 13 estate in the debtor, terminating the estate at that point. See, e.g., In re
Dickey, 64 B.R. 3, 4 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985); Mason v. Williams (In re Mason), 45 B.R. 498, 500-01
(Bankr. D. Or. 1984), affd, 51 B.R. 548 (Bankr. D. Or. 1985). Other courts have held that property
necessary for the execution of the plan's provisions remains property of the Chapter 13 estate and does
not vest in the debtor upon confirmation. See, e.g., In re Root, 61 B.R. 984, 985 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1986);
In re Adams, 12 B.R. 540, 541-42 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981). This Note assumes that confirmation has no
effect.
35. See 11 U.S.C. § 1307.




The father's death occurred more than 180 days after the initial filing
under Chapter 13, but before the date of conversion to Chapter 7.35
Therefore, had this case originally proceeded under Chapter 7, the
inheritance would not have become part of the Chapter 7 bankruptcy
estate.39 Under Chapter 13, however, the bankruptcy estate is much more
inclusive than the one created under Chapter 7. It encompasses not only
the property that would otherwise constitute the Chapter 7 estate but also
"all property of the kind specified in [section 541 of the Code] that the
debtor acquires after the commencement of the case but before the case
is closed, dismissed, or converted .... -40 Thus, the inheritance became
property of the Chapter 13 estate. The issue is "whether the inheritance
remains property of the bankruptcy estate following conversion to
Chapter 7"41
The numerous courts addressing this issue have reached various results
for different reasons. When trying to decide whether property42 acquired
by the debtor during the pendency of the Chapter 13 case should be
included in the Chapter 7 estate upon conversion, most courts have
focused on a single question: Which date determines what property is to
be included in the converted bankruptcy estate-the date of the initial
Chapter 13 filing, or the date on which the case was converted to
Chapter 7? Similarly, in a case like In re Lybrook, the issue is the date on
which the 180-day provision of section 5414' begins to run. The courts
that have addressed this problem are not in agreement as to which date
should control." In fact, it appears that the courts are almost evenly
divided on the issue.45
The issue of which date determines property of the Chapter 7 estate
often arises in the context of post-petition, pre-conversion 4  income
38. Id.
39. Id. The bankruptcy estate consists of "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property
as of the commencement of the case." I 1 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). It also includes "any interest in property
that would have been property of the estate if such interest had been an interest of the debtor on the date
of filing of the petition, and that the debtor acquires or becomes entitled to acquire within 180 days after
such date ... by bequest, devise, or inheritance." I 1 U.S.C. § 541(a)(5), (a)(5)(A) (emphasis added).
40. 11 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(1). Note that § 1306 does not contain a 180-day time limit.
41. In re Lybrook, 107 B.R at 612 (emphasis in original).
42. For purposes of this Note, the term "property" encompasses both post-petition wages paid into
a plan and assets acquired by the debtor post-petition. The term "post-petition" refers to the time period
after the debtor files a petition for Chapter 13 relief.
43. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(5).
44. In re Lepper, 58 B.R. 896, 899 (Bankr. D. Md. 1986).
45. For cases holding that the date of the initial Chapter 13 filing is the relevant date, see infra note
50. For cases holding that the date of conversion should control, see infra note 52.
46. The term "pre-conversion" refers to the time period before the debtor converts to Chapter 7.
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received by the debtor which has not yet been distributed to creditors.
Some courts take the view that such funds do not become part of the
converted Chapter 7 estate. These courts hold that undistributed funds in
the hands of the Chapter 13 trustee must be returned to the debtor upon
conversion to Chapter 7, without any need for the debtor to claim the
funds as exempt. This position is based primarily on section 541(a)(1),
which defines "property of the estate, 47 and section 348(a),48 which
determines the effect of conversion and sets forth what some refer to as
the "relation-back principle.1 49  "The rationale drawn from these
provisions is that the commencement of the Chapter 7 case 'relates back'
to the date [of the] Chapter 13 [filing] and, thus, the converted Chapter 7
estate ... must be determined as of this date."50
Other courts hold that undistributed funds held by the Chapter 13 trustee
must be turned over to the Chapter 7 trustee upon conversion.5 These
courts take the position that the funds become property of the converted
Chapter 7 estate, and view the correct date for deciding what constitutes
property of the estate as the date of conversion, rather than the date of
filing in Chapter 13.52
47. For the text of 11 U.S.C. § 541(a), see supra note 39.
48. For the text of 11 U.S.C. § 348(a), see infra note 70.
49. 9 AM. Ju,. 2D Bankruptcy § 908 (1991). For a detailed discussion of the "relation back"
argument, see infra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
50. 9 AM. JuR. 2D Bankruptcy § 908 (1991). The debtor does not acquire an interest in post-petition
income paid to, and remaining undistributed in the hands of, the Chapter 13 trustee until after the filing
date. Therefore, the undistributed payments are not properly considered property of the converted
Chapter 7 estate under § 541(a)(1). Rather, these are the debtor's property, the same as if the debtor had
originally filed in Chapter 7. In re Peters, 44 B.R. 68 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984); In re Lennon, 65 B.R.
130 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986).
A number of other courts have also held that the date of the original Chapter 13 filing should control.
Genova v. Thurman (In re Thurman), 43 B.R. 108 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1984) (finding that the date of filing
controls exemptions); In re Bullock, 41 B.R. 637 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984) (finding that the date of filing
controls status of undistributed wage deductions); Oliphant v. Amarillo Pantex Fed. Credit Union (In
re Oliphant), 40 B.R. 577 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1984) (holding that the date of filing controls right of set-
off against post-petition credit union account funds); In re McFadden, 37 B.R. 520 (Bankr. M.D. Pa.
1984) (holding that the date of filing controls status of undistributed wage deductions); Hannan v.
Kirschenbaum (In re Hannan), 24 B.R. 691 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982) (finding that the date of filing
controls status of post-petition accrual of damage claim, undistributed wage deductions, and post-petition
account funds).
51. 9 AM. JUL 2D Bankruptcy §§ 910-12 (1991).
52. Id. § 910; see, e.g., Resendez v. Linquist, 691 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1982); In re Daniels, 79 B.R.
88 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987); In re Bump, 54 B.R. 657 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1985); In re Kao, 52 B.R. 452
(Bankr. D. Ore. 1985); In re Wanderlich, 36 B.R. 710 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1984); see also Salamone v.
Bank of Commerce (In re Salamone), 46 B.R. 19 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984) (date of conversion controls
status of post-petition accretions in value of property); Dennis v. W.S. Badcock Corp. (In re Dennis),
31 B.R. 128 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1983) (date of conversion controls status of post-petition accretions in
value of property); In re Tracy, 28 B.R. 189 (Bankr. D. Me. 1983) (date of conversion controls status
1993]
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In attempting to determine what property belongs in the converted
bankruptcy estate, the courts have advanced many arguments. Some of
these arguments are based on the language and policies underlying
particular sections of the Code, while others are based on broad policy
considerations of the Code generally.
II. ARGUMENTS BASED ON THE LANGUAGE AND
POLICIES OF PARTICULAR CODE SECTIONS
A. Statutory Construction
In trying to determine the composition of the bankruptcy estate upon
conversion, one must first look to the Code and determine the meaning of
the relevant sections. The general rule of statutory construction is that
where the law is clear and unambiguous it should be applied literally."
However, where statutory intent is unclear, other evidence of meaning or
intent, such as legislative history, may be consulted.
5 4
A bankruptcy case implicates many sections of the Code. The
provisions of chapters 1, 3, and 5 apply to all bankruptcy cases,5 in
addition to the sections of the particular Chapter under which the debtor
has filed5 6 (or to which the case has been converted). Therefore,
statutory interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code should be "a holistic
endeavor."5 7 When determining the meaning of a certain Code section,
of undistributed wage deductions); In re Richardson, 20 B.R. 490 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1982) (date of
conversion controls status of undistributed wage deductions).
53. 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.04 (5th ed. 1992).
54. As the Supreme Court has declared: "In the interpretation of statutes, the function of the courts
is easily stated. It is to construe the language so as to give effect to the intent of Congress." United
States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 542 (1940).
55. 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1988). These chapters are entitled as follows: Chapter 1: General
Provisions; Chapter 3: Case Administration; and Chapter 5: Creditors, the Debtor, and the Estate. Unless
otherwise specified, the provisions of these three chapters apply to all bankruptcy cases.
56. The Code provides for five different forms of bankruptcy relief. They are Chapter 7:
Liquidation; Chapter 9: Adjustment of Debts of a Municipality; Chapter 11: Reorganization; Chapter
12: Adjustment of Debts of a Family Farmer With Regular Annual Income; and Chapter 13: Adjustment
of Debts of an Individual With Regular Income. These forms of relief are commonly referred to by the
particular chapter of the Code in which they appear.
57. See United Say. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988). In a
dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun recently reiterated the Court's earlier view on interpreting the
Bankruptcy Code:
When analyzing a bankruptcy statute, the Court, of course, looks to its plain language.
But the Court has warned against an overly literal interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code.
"[W]e must not be guided by a single sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole
law, and to its object and policy." The strict language of the Bankruptcy Code does not
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consideration must be given to other sections or subsections which may
be affected by, or have an effect on, a particular interpretation. Thus,
"effect of conversion as provided under section 34858 must further be
examined against the statutory scheme of sections 301, 541, 1306, [and]
103(h), and of Rule 1019(1)," ' 9 and the policies that stand behind each.
1. Arguments Based on 11 U.S.C. § 103(h)
Section 103, which governs the applicability of Bankruptcy Code
chapters, specifically provides in subsection 103(h) that "Chapter 13 of
this title applies only in a case under such chapter."6 What this means
for a case that has been converted from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 has been
the subject of considerable dispute.
Some argue, as the court in In re Lennon6' did, that this language
"logically" means that the applicability of Chapter 13's provisions are
limited to cases that originate and remain under Chapter 13. Under this
argument, section 1306, which expands the definition of "property of the
estate" under Chapter 13 to include almost all property that the debtor
acquired after commencement, no longer applies once the case is
converted to Chapter 7.62 Therefore, section 541 becomes the sole
determinant of which property is to be included in the new Chapter 7
estate and the Chapter 13 estate is treated as if it had never existed.63
Under this reading, an inheritance that becomes property of the Chapter
13 estate because it is received by the debtor more than 180 days after
filing could be, upon conversion, properly excluded from the new
Chapter 7 estate.64
control, even if the statutory language has a "plain" meaning, if the application of that
language will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intention of its drafters.
Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 565 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted).
58. See infra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
59. In re Mansuy, 94 B.R. 443, 444 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988). Section 301 defines the
"commencement of a case" for a voluntary bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 301. Section 541, which applies
to all bankruptcies, determines the property to be included in the estate. Id. § 541. Section 1306, which
only applies to Chapter 13 bankruptcies, determines the property to be included in the Chapter 13 estate.
Id. § 1306. Section 103 governs the applicability of Bankruptcy Code chapters. Id. § 103. Rule 1019
of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure explains the effect of a conversion on creditors' claims.
FED. R. BANKR. P. 1019.
60. I1 U.S.C. § 103(h).
61. 65 B.R. 130 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986).
62. Id. at 135.
63. Id. at 134.
64. This assumes that the date of the original Chapter 13 filing is the correct date for determining
property of the estate.
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This reasoning is flawed. Section 103(h) does not dictate that the
Chapter 13 estate be terminated retroactively upon conversion. Rather,
section 103(h) merely terminates the effect of section 1306(a) from the
point of conversion onward. After the case is converted to Chapter 7,
section 541 should control. However, this does not mean that property
acquired while the case was under Chapter 13 must now be excluded from
the bankruptcy estate. Section 541(a)(7) provides that the bankruptcy
estate also includes "[a]ny interest in property that the estate acquires
after the commencement of the case." '65 Obviously, this provision is
broad enough to encompass in the converted Chapter 7 estate all post-
petition, pre-conversion property included in the Chapter 13 estate at the
time of conversion."
Furthermore, to say that the provisions of Chapter 13 should have no
effect on the converted Chapter 7 case would be "inconsistent with the
statutory scheme regarding post-confirmation amendments. 67 Under the
rationale of cases like In re Lennon, if a Chapter 13 debtor receives
enhanced funds through an inheritance, increased income, lottery
proceeds, or other source, the debtor could deprive creditors of these
benefits by converting to Chapter 7. This result circumvents section 1306,
which includes post-petition property in the bankruptcy estate, and section
1329(a) and (b), which allows debtors and creditors to modify the plan to
take into account a change in circumstances. "When property is received
during the pendency of a Chapter 13 case, creditors receive the benefit of
this property.1
61
2. Arguments Based on 11 U.S.C. Section 348(a), (b), and (c)
Section 348 controls the effect of a conversion of a case from one
chapter of the Bankruptcy Code to another. It does not directly address the
composition of the bankruptcy estate. It states only that, with certain
exceptions, conversion "does not effect a change in the date of the filing
of the petition, the commencement of the case, or the order for relief.
69
What this language portends for property acquired post-petition by the
Chapter 13 estate, but before conversion to Chapter 7, is unclear.
65. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(7).
66. Brief for Appellee at 14, In re Lybrook, 951 F.2d 136 (7th Cir. 1991) (No. 90-2926).
67. In re Tworek, 107 B.R. 666 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1989).
68. Id. at 668; see Arnold v. Weast (In re Arnold), 869 F.2d 240 (4th Cir. 1989).
69. 11 U.S.C. § 348(a) (1988). It is the "relation back" language that leads to confusion as to what
property should be included in the Chapter 7 estate upon conversion.
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Subsections (b) and (c), which, by the terms of section 348(a), are
exceptions to the general rule of subsection (a), 7" provide that under
certain sections of the Code (which are not applicable here) the date of
conversion shall be deemed the date of the order for relief' rather than
the date the petition was originally filed.72 Since only the exceptions to
section 348(a) state that the order for relief is the date of conversion, the
implication is that under section 348(a) an order for relief on a conversion
is deemed to relate back to the date of the original order for relief, which,
according to section 301,"3  would be the date of the filing
(commencement) of the initial Chapter 13 petition.7 4  Therefore,
according to this argument, unless the proceedings fall into one of the
exceptions, the date of filing should control.
70. Section 348(a) provides:
Conversion of a case from a case under one chapter of this title to a case under
another chapter of this title constitutes an order for relief under the chapter to which the
case is converted, but, except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) of this section, does
not effect a change in the date of the filing of the petition, the commencement of the
case, or the order for relief.
Id. (emphasis added).
71. The term "order for relief' refers to the bankruptcy court's order granting the debtor's request
for bankruptcy protection.
72. Section 348(b) provides:
Unless the court for cause orders otherwise, in sections 701(a) [appointment of an
interim trustee], 727(a)(10) [written waiver of discharge], 727(b) [effect of a Chapter 7
discharge], 728(a) [taxable period of the debtor], 728(b) [filing of tax returns], 1102(a)
[appointment of creditors' committee], 1110(a)(1) [aircraft equipment and vessels],
1121(b) [time limit for filing of plan by debtor], 1121(c) [who may file plan after the
time limit], 1141(d)(4) [written waiver of discharge], 1146(a) [taxable period of debtor],
1146(b) [filing of tax returns], 1301(a) [stay of action against co-debtor], 1305(a) [filing
of post-petition claims], 1201(a) [stay of action against co-debtor], 1221 [time limit for
debtor to file plan], and 1228(a) [effect of written waiver of discharge] of this title, "the
order for relief under this chapter" in a chapter to which a case has been converted under
section 706, 1112, 1307, or 1208 of this title means the conversion of such case to such
chapter.
11 U.S.C. § 348(b).
Section 348(c) provides:
Sections 342 [concerning the giving of notice] and 365(d) [concerning the running
of 60-day period in which trustee may assume or reject executory contracts and unexpired
leases of debtor] of this title apply in a case that has been converted under section 706,
1112, 1307, or 1208 of this title, as if the conversion order were the order for relief.
11 U.S.C. § 348(c).
73. Section 301 provides:
A voluntary case under a chapter of this title is commenced by the filing with the
bankruptcy court of a petition under such chapter by an entity that may be a debtor under
such chapter. The commencement of a voluntary case under a chapter of this title
constitutes an order for relief under such chapter.
11 U.S.C. § 301 (emphasis added).
74. In re Bullock, 41 B.R. 637, 639 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984).
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Since section 541, which defines property of the bankruptcy estate, is
not mentioned in section 348(b) or (c), it would appear that
"commencement of the case" as used in section 541 would be controlled
by section 348(a).75 Therefore "commencement of the case" refers to the
date upon which the Chapter 13 petition was filed rather than the date the
case was converted to Chapter 7.76 "Thus by the clear language of
section 348(a), the conversion relates back to the initial filing of the
bankruptcy petition i.e. the commencement of the case, which, as provided
in section 541(a), is the date the property of the estate is determined." 77
Under section 541, the property of the Chapter 7 estate consists of "all
legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the
commencement of the case. 78 Since the debtor does not acquire an
interest in the inheritance until after the commencement of his case, this
property does not become property of the Chapter 7 estate.
This proposition is supported not only by the structure of the
Bankruptcy Code but also by congressional policy.79 "Chapter 13 ...
was intended to 'encourage[] more debtors to repay their debts over an
extended period rather than to opt for straight bankruptcy liquidation and
discharge."' 80 In return for a debtor's resolve to commit more of his
assets to the repayment of his creditors than would be required under
Chapter 7, Chapter 13 provides a debtor with a number of benefits that are
unavailable under Chapter 7.81
In pointing out these benefits, the court in In re Peters noted:
In addition to the benefits specifically enumerated in the legislative
history, other benefits can be identified. One such benefit is the
provisions of § 348(a). Since this section treats the date of
commencement of the Chapter 13 case as the date of commencement
of the Chapter 7 case after conversion, the debtor is not penalized for
originally pursuing a Chapter 13 case instead of a Chapter 7 case. If
the debtor is unable to succeed under Chapter 13, he is treated as if he
had originally filed a petition under Chapter 7.82
75. "Under the statutory interpretation doctrine of inclusio unius est exclusio alterius [the inclusion
of one is the exclusion of another] §§ 1306 and 541 are therefore excluded from any exception under
§§ 348(b) and (c)." In re Horton, 130 B.R. 326, 328 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991); see also BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 763 (6th ed. 1990) (inclusio unius est exclusio alterius).
76. In re Peters, 44 B.R. 68, 70 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984).
77. Thrush v. Erchenbrecher (In re Erchenbrecher), 85 B.R. 42, 44 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988).
78. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1988).
79. In re Peters, 44 B.R. at 70.
80. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 9, at 5, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5966).
81. See id. at 71. For a discussion of Congress's goal of encouraging debtors to choose Chapter 13
over Chapter 7, see infra notes 124-30 and accompanying text.
82. In re Peters, 44 B.R. at 71.
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Nevertheless, the proposition that the exceptions to section 348 prove
that post-petition assets do not become property of the Chapter 7 estate
upon conversion has not been universally accepted. The court in In re
Wanderlich83 held that "section 348 operates to complement, not to
replace, sections 541 and 1306. Especially noteworthy is the fact that
section 348 in no way interferes with the section 1306 declaration that
post-petition, pre-conversion property in a Chapter 13 case is 'property of
the estate. ' '8 4 For example, section 348(c) plainly authorizes the
Chapter 7 trustee to assume or to reject all executory contracts or
unexpired leases of the debtor, including those arising post-petition and
even those arising post-confirmation." This choice would not be possible
if those interests were not a part of the estate following conversion.
86
However, this reasoning was criticized by the court in In re Lepper.
87
"The Wanderlich court apparently presumed that unless all of the former
Chapter 13 debtor's property became property of the estate upon
conversion, the Chapter 7 trustee would have authority over none of
it."88 The Lepper court felt that this reading of section 348(c) was far
too broad. According to the court, section 348(c) "merely carves out from
the former Chapter 13 debtor's property a category of interests which are
within the Chapter 7 trustee's authority and therefore subject to the
creditor protections of § 365."89 The Lepper court held that section
348(c) is a very specific provision and that it means only what it says,
and nothing more. The provision merely facilitates the trustee's
management of the bankruptcy estate by setting a time for the assumption
or rejection of executory contracts and leases. Such a power would not
exist otherwise. 90
In response to the arguments that the original date of filing controls,
some contend that section 348 does not interfere with the section 1306
declaration that post-petition, pre-conversion property in a Chapter 13
83. 36 B.R. 710 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1984).
84. Id. at 714; see also In re Tracy, 28 B.R. 189 (Bankr. D. Me. 1983) (holding that claims arising
prior to the date of conversion of a Chapter 13 case to a Chapter 7 case are treated, for purposes of
payment and discharge, as if the debtor had never filed a Chapter 13 petition but had commenced its
bankruptcy case by filing a Chapter 7 petition on the date of conversion).
85. Under § 365(d)(1), the trustee has 60 days after the "order for relief' (which according to §
348(c) is the order for conversion) in which to assume or reject executory contracts and unexpired leases
of the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(1) (1988).
86. In re Wanderlich, 36 B.R. at 714.
87. 58 B.R. 896 (Bankr. D. Md. 1986).





case is "property of the estate," 9' and does not explicitly state that upon
conversion a case is to be treated as if it had been originally filed under
the chapter to which it is converted. Section 348(a) merely specifies that
the date of filing of the petition, the commencement of the case, or the
order for relief are unaffected by conversion.92 Section 348(a) requires
that a case converted from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 be treated as if it had
commenced upon the.date of the Chapter 13 filing, but this does not
necessarily mean that it must be treated as if it had always been a
Chapter 7 case.93 Nor does it mean that the bankruptcy estate must be
determined only by the property interests held by the debtor at the time
the Chapter 13 petition was originally filed.
94
Those courts which find that the converted estate is composed solely of
property that existed on the date of the Chapter 13 filing (and within 180
days thereof) rely upon a very literal and isolated reading of the Code.95
"Section 348 cannot be construed in isolation. Like the pieces of a
mosaic, it must be viewed along with the other statutory provisions of
which it is intimately a part, in order to properly understand the entire
creation." '96 Section 348 is not designed to change what has gone on
before, but to leave matters as they exist on the date of conversion. 97 To
require the court to reshuffle the bankruptcy estate upon conversion is to
make section 348 a "source of disruption." '
A more logical view is to see section 348 as a provision that ensures
continuity throughout the bankruptcy proceeding. The plain language of
section 54199 leads to the conclusion that it preserves the bankruptcy
estate as it existed just before conversion. The bankruptcy estate following
conversion should be no different than the estate immediately preceding
conversion.
91. In re Wanderlich, 36 B.R. at 714.
92. In re Tracy, 28 B.R. 189, 190 (Bankr. D. Me. 1983).
93. Id.; see also In re Kao, 52 B.R. 452 (Bankr. D. Ore. 1985) (holding only that the Chapter 13
filing date is adopted by the conversion to Chapter 7). As the court in In re Lybrook said: "It is one
thing to recognize that conversion does not affect the date upon which the case was commenced. It is
quite another thing, however, to draw from this principle the doctrine that the case will be treated as
though it had always proceeded under Chapter 7.' Robb v. Lybrook (In re Lybrook), 107 B.R. 611,612
(Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989), aft'd, 135 B.R. 321 (N.D. Ind. 1990), aff'd, 951 F.2d 136 (7th Cir. 1991).
94. See In re Tracy, 28 B.R. 189 (treating wages earned prior to conversion of the case to
Chapter 7, but subsequent to the filing of the Chapter 13 petition, as part of the bankruptcy estate).
95. See In re Lennon, 65 B.R. 130, 133 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986), superseded by statute as stated
in In re Luna, 73 B.R. 999 (N.D. Il1. 1987) (applying the relation-back principle which "requires the
court to look back to the date of the filing of the original Chapter 13 petition to determine the creation
of the estate and what is included in the property of the Chapter 7 estate").
96. In re Lybrook, 107 B.R. at 612-13.
97. Id. at 613.
98. Id.
99. The bankruptcy estate consists of "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as
of the commencement of the case." 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1988).
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The Chapter 13 bankruptcy estate is created upon the commencement of
the case.' 0 At the moment of creation, the bankruptcy estate essentially
consists of all of the property in which the debtor has an interest.' 0'
"The estate does not, however, remain static. It also includes 'any interest
in the property that the estate acquires after the commencement of the
case."' 10 2 This is the status of the estate existing at the time of
conversion. There is no express language in section 348(a) requiring this
estate to be terminated upon conversion. Since under section 1306(a) the
Chapter 13 bankruptcy estate includes post-petition property, it makes
sense that property of the new Chapter 7 estate should be determined on
the date of conversion.'0 3
3. Arguments Based on 11 U.S.C. Section 348(d) and Rule 1019
A number of courts have held that treating wages earned or property
acquired after the Chapter 13 filing but prior to conversion as property of
the new chapter 7 estate is consistent with the treatment of claims against
the debtor which arise during the same period.'0 4 Under section
348(d),"0 5 claims against the debtor which arise post-petition but pre-
conversion are generally treated as having arisen before the date of the
original Chapter 13 filing, and thus, may be discharged after conversion
to Chapter 7.V6 Because section 348(d) allows the debtor to discharge
claims arising during the pendency of the Chapter 13 proceeding and prior
to conversion, some courts have reasoned that, for the sake of equity,0 7
the debtor should be required to place property acquired during this
interim period in the converted Chapter 7 estate. 0 8
Further support for the conclusion that the date of conversion controls
can be found in Rule 1019(1). '09 The Advisory Note to the Rule
100. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a).
101. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1).
102. In re Lybrook, 107 B.R. at 613 (emphasis added) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(7)).
103. In re Kao, 52 B.1L 452 (Bankr. D. Ore. 1985).
104. Id. at 452; In re Wanderlich, 36 B.RL 710 (Bankr. W.DN.Y. 1984); In re Tracy, 28 B.R. 189
(Bankr. D. Me. 1983).
105. "A claim against the estate or the debtor that arises after the order for relief but before
conversion in a case that is converted... shall be treated for all purposes as if such claim had arisen
immediately before the date of the filing of the petition." 11 U.S.C. § 348(d) (1988).
106. In re Tracy, 28 B.L 189.
107. For a discussion of the equitable treatment of debtors and creditors, see infra part III.B.
108. In re Kao, 52 B.R. 452; In re Wanderlich, 36 B.R. 710; In re Tracy, 28 B.R. 189.
109. Rule 1019(l)(A) provides:
When a... chapter 13 case has been converted... to a chapter 7 case... [l]ists,
inventories, [and] schedules ... theretofore filed shall be deemed to be filed in the
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explains that when the debtor in a converted case has not previously
prepared a schedule of assets, he must do so as if a Chapter 7 petition had
been filed on the date of conversion. Since debtors must claim exemptions
in the schedule of assets," ° Rule 1019(1) strongly suggests that the date
of conversion controls what exemptions may be claimed in a converted
case."' If the date of conversion controls what exemptions can be
claimed, it seems only logical that the same day should be used to
determine property of the estate (which of course may be subject to this
exemption).
B. Arguments Comparing Conversion with
Dismissing and Refiling Under Chapter 7
Should Chapter 13 prove to be unsatisfactory, the debtor has two
primary options. The case may be converted to Chapter 7, or it may be
dismissed and followed by a separate petition for Chapter 7.112 From the
debtor's standpoint, there should be no substantive difference between
conversion and dismissal followed by a separate Chapter 7 proceeding.
Under either option, the scope of the discharge will include post-petition
debts incurred during the Chapter 13 proceeding due to section
348(d)." 3  Thus, Congress clearly intended that this choice of
alternatives would have no effect upon the scope of discharge. Therefore,
it is likely that Congress intended that the property of the estate should
also be the same under either option.
chapter 7 case, unless the court directs otherwise. If they have not been previously filed,
the debtor shall comply with Rule 1007 [(i.e., shall file the documents)] as if an order for
relief had been entered on an involuntary petition on the date of the entry of the order
directing that the case continue under chapter 7.
FED. R. BANKR. P. 1019(l)(A) (emphasis added).
I10. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(a).
111. Armstrong v. Lindberg (In re Lindberg), 735 F.2d 1087, 1090-91 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1073 (1984).
112. The opportunity to do either is almost absolute. See 11 U.S.C. § 1307(a), (b) (1988). However,
a debtor would probably prefer conversion since a dismissal followed by a separate Chapter 7 petition
would require additional expenses including another filing fee.
113. Section 348(d) provides:
A claim against the estate or the debtor that arises after the order for relief but before
conversion in a case that is converted under section 1112, 1307, or 1208 of this title,
other than a claim specified in section 503(b) of this title, shall be treated for all purposes
as if such claim had arisen immediately before the date of the filing of the petition.
11 U.S.C. § 348(d). Therefore, post-petition creditors of the Chapter 13 case are treated as pre-petition
creditors (and are thus subject to discharge) and when a new Chapter 7 is filed those creditors actually
become pre-petition creditors since they became creditors before the Chapter 7 petition was filed.
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Where the case is dismissed and a new petition is filed, there is no
question that the property acquired by the debtor during the course of the
Chapter 13 proceeding becomes part of the bankruptcy estate in a
subsequent proceeding. This is so because property of the Chapter 7 estate
includes all nonexempt property that the debtor has an interest in "as of
the commencement of the case."' 1 4 Under this alternative, the date of
the commencement of the case would be the date that the new Chapter 7
petition is filed." 5 Where there is a conversion from Chapter 13 to
Chapter 7, however, debtors may argue that the "as of the commencement
of the case" language refers back to the date that the Chapter 13 estate
was filed, since there is no need to refile when one converts. Under this
interpretation, if followed to the conclusion that is most favorable to the
debtor, the new Chapter 7 estate would not include any property that was
acquired more than 180 days after the Chapter 13 filing. This
interpretation would lead to very different bankruptcy estates, depending
on which option the debtor chose. The choice between conversion and
dismissal would give debtors the ability to control which assets are to be
made available to satisfy the very claims which are equally dischargeable
under either option.'
1 6
The Seventh Circuit has cautioned against interpreting the Bankruptcy
Code in a way that would create strategic incentives which could
influence the decision to choose between alternative proceedings."17 The
exclusion of post-petition property from the converted bankruptcy estate
would create such an incentive when Chapter 13 proves unsuccessful for
the debtor. There should be no difference in the consequences to either
debtors or creditors of a conversion as opposed to a dismissal followed by
a separate proceeding." 8 "The price of that discharge should not depend
upon which alternative is selected."'1 9
114. See II U.S.C. § 541(a)(1).
115. See 11 U.S.C. § 301.
116. Robb v. Lybrook (In re Lybrook), 107 B.R. 611, 614 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989), aff'd, 135 B.R.
321 (N.D. Ind. 1990), aft'd, 951 F.2d 136 (7th Cir. 1991).
117. See Northwest Eng'g Co. v. United Steelworkers of Am. (In re Northwest Eng'g Co.), 863 F.2d
1313, 1317-18 (7th Cir. 1988) (addressing similar concerns in the context of 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(3)).
118. See In re Wanderlich, 36 B.R. 710, 716 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1984).
119. In re Lybrook, 107 B.R. at 614.
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III. ARGUMENTS BASED ON BROAD POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
When trying to determine the composition of the bankruptcy estate upon
conversion, the plain language of the statute should arguably control.' 20
However, as was demonstrated above, the language of the relevant Code
sections is not plain enough to be subject to only one interpretation.121
Because statutory interpretation has not been particularly helpful in
resolving the problem, policy arguments are explored below.
A. The Goal of Encouraging Chapter 13
There are two constant themes that run throughout congressional support
of Chapter 13. First is the belief that a Chapter 13 proceeding benefits all
parties: the debtor has the opportunity to repay his debts while
maintaining control of his home and business, and the creditor benefits
because of the increased probability of repayment and the greater amount
that is likely to be distributed pursuant to a periodic payment plan, as
opposed to a one-time liquidation procedure.' 22 Second is the goal that
the honest debtor who meets the terms of his plan should be given
effective bankruptcy relief and should be ensured a fresh start. 23
When Congress enacted the Code, one of its primary objectives was to
increase the use of Chapter 13 plans as opposed to Chapter 7
liquidations. 2  An "explicit effort" was made to encourage debtors
120. "[T]he words of the statute remain the most persuasive indication of Congressional intent, and
their apparent meaning should be rejected only on substantial, unambiguous evidence supporting a
contrary interpretation." In re Lepper, 58 B.R. 896, 899 (Bankr. D. Md. 1986) (quoting State Water
Control Bd. v. Train, 559 F.2d 921, 924-25 n.20 (4th Cir. 1977)).
121. At least one court has stated that there is no way to reconcile the conflicting statutory language
of §§ 348, 541, and 1306. See In re Shattuck, 62 B.R. 14, 15 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1986) (holding that
property of the estate comprising the bankruptcy estate includes only assets that existed as of the
original filing date).
122. H.L REP. No. 595, supra note 9, at 118, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6079.
123. Id. at 117-18.
124. In supporting the adoption of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, the Committee on the
Judiciary of the House of Representatives noted:
This bill attempts to cure these inadequacies in the Bankruptcy Act and to prevent
the frequent problems confronting consumer debtors that have occurred both in the
bankruptcy court and out. First, the bill simplifies, expands, and makes more flexible
wage earner plans, called plans for Individuals with Regular Income, under the bill.
Second, many of the provisions in the current bankruptcy law that enable private action
to undo the beneficial effects of bankruptcy are changed. Third, the debtor is given
adequate exemptions and other protections to ensure that bankruptcy will provide a fresh
start.... The premises of the bill with respect to consumer bankruptcy are that use of the
bankruptcy law should be a last resort; that if it is used, debtors should attempt repayment
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to consider Chapter 13 first, before resorting to other alternatives. The
House Report on bankruptcy law revision described those beneficial
features of Chapter 13 designed to persuade debtors to choose it over
Chapter 7:
The benefit to the debtor of developing a plan of repayment under
chapter 13, rather than opting for liquidation under chapter 7, is that
it permits the debtor to protect his assets. In a liquidation case, the
debtor must surrender his nonexempt assets for liquidation and sale by
the trustee. Under chapter 13, the debtor may retain his property by
agreeing to repay his creditors. Chapter 13 also protects a debtor's
credit standing far better than a straight bankruptcy, because he is
viewed by the credit industry as a better risk. In addition, it satisfies
many debtors' desire to avoid the stigma attached to straight
bankruptcy and to retain the pride attendant on being able to meet
one's obligations. The benefit to creditors is self-evident: their losses
will be significantly less than if their debtors opt for straight
bankruptcy.'26
Among the incentives that Congress added in 1978 to make Chapter 13
a more attractive option to debtors was an expansion of the class of
debtors who would be eligible to file under Chapter 13127 and a
liberalization of the discharge provisions. 2 The changes brought about
by the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 198429
evidence that Congress continues to favor the use of Chapter 13 as
opposed to Chapter 7.30
under Chapter 13 ... ; and finally, whether the debtor uses Chapter 7... or Chapter 13
.... bankruptcy relief should be effective, and should provide the debtor with a fresh
start.
Id.
125. SOMMER, supra note 14, at 187.
126. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 9, at 118, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6079.
127. "Pursuant to § 101(24), individuals with regular income are eligible to file under Chapter 13.
This is an expansion of the previous requirement that the individual be a wage earner." Roy Ann Russ,
Note, Chapter 13, 2 BANKR. DEv. J. 147, 148 n. I1 (1985) (citation omitted).
128. "[Section] 1328 provides that, while educational loans are not dischargeable under Chapter 7
due to the operation of § 523(a)(8)(A), they are dischargeable under Chapter 13." Id. at 148 n.12
(citation omitted).
129. Pub L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984).
130. DANIEL R. COWANs, COWANS BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 19.1 n.5 (1989 ed.). Cowans
illustrates this as follows:
[B]y amendment to 11 U.S.C. § 342, subsection (b) was added: "Prior to the
commencement of a case under this title by an individual whose debts are primarily
consumer debts, the clerk shall give written notice to such individual that indicates each
Chapter of this title under which such individual may proceed." Also, Official Form No.
I [Petition] was altered to require, in the instance of a consumer debtor, an affidavit by
debtor's attorney stating that the debtor has been informed that he "may proceed under
Chapter 7 or 13 of Title 11, United States Code," and has been advised of the relief
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It is in the public interest to encourage debtors to make good faith
efforts to repay their debts through a Chapter 13 plan, rather than to
liquidate. A Chapter 13 plan is "a means of avoiding the waste, hardship
and social and economic disruptions usually attendant upon liquidating
bankruptcy proceedings under Chapter 7.'3' Therefore, it is argued, if
the Chapter 13 approach fails and the debtor is forced to convert, it would
be unfair to penalize the debtor by subjecting post-petition earnings or
property acquired more than 180 days after filing to the claims of
creditors when such property would not have been included in the estate
had the debtor originally filed under Chapter 7V32 Furthermore, it is
claimed that such a rule would thwart congressional policy and discourage
debtors from choosing Chapter 13 in the first place.' 33
In In re Bobroff, 34 the Third Circuit held that tort causes of action
which had accrued post-petition to a Chapter 13 debtor did not become
property of the Chapter 7 estate upon subsequent conversion. 135
This result is consonant with the Bankruptcy Code's goal of
encouraging the use of debt repayment plans rather than liquidation. If
debtors must take the risk that property acquired during the course of
an attempt at repayment will have to be liquidated for the benefit of
creditors if Chapter 13 proves unavailing, the incentive to give
Chapter 13-which must be voluntary-a try will be greatly
diminished. 1
36
Thus it is believed that if their post-petition earnings were put at risk,
debtors might be inclined to forego the Chapter 13 option altogether and
immediately file under Chapter 7, with the assurance that they would be
entitled to keep whatever property they receive in the future.' 37
"Though it is understandable that Congress wanted to encourage the use
of Chapter 13, it is difficult to believe that this policy is so imperative
that the legislation was purposely designed to assist debtors in
circumventing their obligations when their ability to meet those
available under each such Chapter.
Id. at n.5 (citation omitted).
131. H.R. REP. No. 1195, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1980).
132. See, e.g., McCullough v. Luna (In re Luna), 73 B.R. 999 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987); In re
Shattuck, 62 B.R. 14 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1986); In re Peters, 44 B.R. 68 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984); In re
Lennon, 65 B.R. 130 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986).
133. See supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
134. Bobroff v. Continental Bank (In re Bobroft), 766 F.2d 797 (3d Cir. 1985).
135. Id. at 803-04.
136. Id. at 803 (citation omitted).
137. Barry Zaretsky, Bankruptcy Practice, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 25, 1987, at 1, 7.
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obligations has improved."' 38 Furthermore, it is difficult to see how
making conversion to Chapter 7 such an attractive option furthers the
congressional interest in promoting Chapter 13. Chapter 7 will continue
to be the choice for those debtors who have little or no assets. In addition,
Chapter 7 will also be adopted (albeit in a roundabout fashion) by those
debtors who at first appear likely candidates for Chapter 13 (those who
have assets worth protecting and a steady income) but who later receive
additional wealth and decide that they can not be bothered with a
Chapter 13 plan. The property that they were originally trying to protect
may not be so attractive when compared to their new-found wealth.
Thus, using the date of filing for determining property of the bankruptcy
estate may encourage more debtors to initially file under Chapter 13." 3"
However, a debtor who later finds prosperity (after 180 days) will be
encouraged to convert to Chapter 7. Certainly the goal of Congress was
not to encourage debtors to merely file a Chapter 13 petition; it was also
hoped that debtors would stay with their plans until discharge.
B. Equitable Treatment of Debtors and Creditors
"Bankruptcy Courts are inherently courts of equity with broad remedial
powers."' 40 Therefore, they are not limited to merely looking at the
language of the statute. The court should be able to look at what actually
happened in a particular case and make a decision that is fair to both the
debtor and his creditors.
Limiting the bankruptcy estate to assets that existed at the date of filing
the original Chapter 13 petition frustrates the equities between the debtor
and his creditors. If post-petition assets are excluded from the bankruptcy
estate, then both pre-petition and post-petition creditors of the debtor will
be harmed.
Pre-petition creditors will be prejudiced in two ways. First, by limiting
the bankruptcy estate to those assets that existed on the date of filing, the
pre-petition creditors bear the risk that the value of the bankruptcy estate
will be diminished as the debtor proceeds under Chapter 13. Once the
138. Brief for Appellee at 12, In re Lybrook, 951 F.2d 136 (7th Cir. 1991) (No. 90-2926).
139. This will occur if consumer debtors are actually influenced by what the bankruptcy courts
decide. This is particularly unlikely since one can infer, by the mere fact that a debtor is filing for
bankruptcy, that the debtor does not have much money to spend for quality legal advice.
140. In re Mansuy, 94 B.R. 443,445 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988) (citing In re Ranch House of Orange-
Brevard, Inc., 773 F.2d 1166 (11th Cir. 1985)).
141. The assets in the bankruptcy estate may be affected by many factors that can cause a dramatic
decrease in their value during the pendency of the Chapter 13 case (e.g., depreciation, inflation,
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property is revested in the debtor after confirmation of the Chapter 13
plan, he can do anything with it so long as it is not subject to a lien
provided for in the plan or confirmation order.'42
Thus, during the course of the plan, which can last as long as five
years, a debtor may sell, abandon, consume, or trade-in most of his
assets. Combining this with the possibility of after-acquired property
means that by the time of conversion the estate may have changed
completely in character and amount.
43
Second, even if the estate were not diminished, pre-petition creditors
bear the risk that their share of the bankruptcy estate will shrink if more
claims are made against the debtor after the Chapter 13 petition is filed.
According to section 348(d), all claims arising prior to conversion to
Chapter 7 are treated as if the debtor never filed a Chapter 13 petition.
Instead, the claims are treated as if the debtor commenced the bankruptcy
case by filing a Chapter 7 petition on the date of conversion. 44 Since,
upon conversion, post-petition creditors are treated as if they are pre-
petition creditors, the estate, as defined by section 541 on the
commencement date of the case, will be divided among more creditors
than if the debtor had simply filed a straight Chapter 7 liquidation in the
first place.
141
Excluding post-petition assets from the bankruptcy estate also prejudices
post-petition creditors because these creditors would be denied an interest
in the very property upon which they relied in extending the Chapter 13
debtor credit. 46 Thus, the creditors' reasonable expectations of being
depletion, destruction, theft, and obsolescence).
A debtor who converts two or three years after originally filing a Chapter 13 case may
have, at the time of conversion, completely different kinds of property than what he owned at
the commencement of the Chapter 13. It should be obvious that property of the estate in the
Chapter 13 immediately before conversion is the property of the estate in the succeeding
Chapter 7 case.
Winchester v. Watson (In re Winchester), 46 B.R. 492, 496 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1984) (Elliot, J.,
concurring).
It can be argued that because pre-petition creditors are forced to bear these risks, they should also
be able to share in any benefits that may arise if the debtor's financial position improves during this
period. See id.
142. 11 U.S.C. § 1327(b), (c) (1988).
143. In re Winchester, 46 B.R. at 495.
144. In re Tracy, 28 B.R. 189, 190 (Bankr. D. Me. 1983); see 11 U.S.C. §§ 348(b), (d), 727(b)
(1988).
145. In re Tracy, 28 B.R. at 190 n.1.
146. At least one court argues that there would be very few situations involving post-petition
creditors.
Considering the 1984 Amendments to Title I 1, and particularly new §§ 1325(b)(1) and
1329(a) (preamble), it seems unlikely that Congress considered that there would be many
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repaid, as indicated by the financial state of the debtor or his bankruptcy
estate at the time of the decision to extend credit, would be totally
frustrated by limiting the bankruptcy estate upon conversion. It is only
reasonable that the debtor be required to place after-acquired property into
the Chapter 7 estate if he is going to be relieved from liability of post-
petition claims. 4 7 Post-petition indebtedness is often used to obtain
after-acquired property. 4 ' Section 348(d) "hardly would elect to treat
post-petition creditors of the Chapter 13 debtor as being pre-petition
claimants after conversion to Chapter 7, if post-petition ... property
which the debtor acquired as a result of credit transactions were not to be
included in the debtor's Chapter 7 estate."'
149
In In re Lybrook,50 Judge Posner stated that a rule of "once in always
in is necessary to discourage strategic, opportunistic behavior that hurts
creditors without advancing any legitimate interest of debtors.'' In
addition, such a rule would encourage a Chapter 13 debtor who later
acquires property to stay with the plan. If debtors knew conversion to
Chapter 7 would result in a liquidation of all nonexempt after-acquired
property, they would have a strong incentive to continue with their
Chapter 13 plan and to pay their creditors off over time.
In contrast, if the date of the Chapter 13 filing is used to determine
when property of the converted bankruptcy estate is calculated, then all
risk of loss would be placed on creditors while debtors would benefit
exclusively from any potential good fortune. Furthermore, it may
encourage debtors to choose Chapter 13 for all the wrong reasons.
A debtor who lacks confidence that he can actually work his way out
of his financial hole by payments under a Chapter 13 plan will
nevertheless have an incentive to proceed under that Chapter for as
long as he can, holding his creditors at bay and thus staving off that
evil day when they seize his assets. For he knows that if his position
deteriorates further it is the creditors who will bear the loss, while if
he should get lucky and win a lottery or a legal judgment, or inherit
money (after 180 days have passed ... ), he will be able to keep his
[post-petition] creditors since the trustee or any secured creditor holding a prepetition
claim can object to confirmation if the plan dedicates less than all of the debtor's
projected disposable income, which veto-power effectively precludes payments outside
the plan to post-petition creditors.
In re Lepper, 58 B.R. 896, 902 (Bankr. D. Md. 1986).
147. In re Winchester, 46 B.R. at 495.
148. Id.
149. In re Wanderlich, 36 B.R. 710, 714 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1984).
150. 951 F.2d 136 (7th Cir. 1991).
151. Id. at 137.
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windfall by the simple expedient of converting to Chapter 7-and
remember that the debtor can convert ... at will.'52
Another policy argument to justify using the date of conversion was
articulated in In re Stinson:
153
If the court were to conclude otherwise a debtor with substantial assets
which would not be exempt in a Chapter 7 case, could file a petition
under Chapter 13, obtain confirmation of a plan based solely upon
payments to the trustee from future earnings, be revested with title to
all of the nonexempt property, convert his case to Chapter 7, retain all
of the nonexempt property and obtain a discharge of not only those
debts in existence at the time of the Chapter 13 petition but also those
incurred thereafter and prior to conversion.
154
This is so because section 1327(b) states: "Except as otherwise provided
in the plan or the order confirming the plan, the confirmation of the plan
vests all of the property of the estate in the debtor. '1 5 5 However, those
who favor using the date of filing argue that section 1327(b) is rendered
inapplicable by conversion of the case out of Chapter 13 (due to section
103(h)) in the same way that section 1306 is rendered inapplicable.'
56
As the court in In re Hannan57 put it:
[U]nder a Chapter 13 [plan,] the creditors get only whatever the debtor
agrees to devote to the repayment of their debts out of his future
income. When a Chapter 13 plan does not work out, the debtor has the
privilege of converting to Chapter 7, and when he exercises that right,
no reason of policy suggests itself why the creditors should not be put
back in precisely the same position as they would have been had the
debtor never sought to repay his debts by filing under Chapter 13.' 5
Some argue that "the application of section 1306 after conversion to
Chapter 7 has the effect of penalizing the Chapter 13 debtor for
attempting a Chapter 13 case."' 5 9 A significant policy reason exists,
however, to measure the estate at the date of conversion rather than at the
date of filing the petition-to treat creditors fairly in light of the risks
they bear while the debtor proceeds under Chapter 13. Since a debtor
152. Id. at 137-38.
153. In re Stinson, 27 B.R. 18 (Bankr. D. Ore. 1982).
154. Id. at 20. It is arguable, though, that "those abusive debtors described in Stinsonf are now
subject to the 1984 'watch dog' provision of§ 707(b)." In re Lepper, 58 B.R. 896, 902 (Bankr. D. Md.
1986).
155. 11 U.S.C. § 1327(b) (1988).
156. In reLepper, 58 B.R. at 902.
157. Hannan v. Kirschenbaum (In re Hannan), 24 B.R. 691 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982).
158. Id. at 692.
159. In re Schmeltz, 114 B.R. 607, 610 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1990).
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enters into a Chapter 13 plan voluntarily, he does so only if he thinks that
he is getting a better "deal" (that is, he thinks he is going to have to pay
his creditors less) than he would have under Chapter 7. But when the
"deal" goes sour there is no justification for giving the debtor a better
bargain, at the expense of creditors, than the one the debtor himself
chose. 6 '
Further, it is unlikely that creditors could ever be put back in "precisely
the same position" as they would have been had the debtor never filed
under Chapter 13. "Since the property of the estate in existence when the
petition was filed is rarely intact at the time of conversion, the approach
in Hannan and cases similar to it does not account for the realities of the
preconfirmation reorganization process and the impact on all
creditors."' 6 ' The possibility for the debtor to legitimately exhaust his
estate and to incur further debt under Chapter 13 can seriously alter the
creditors' positions.
"To exclude post-petition property from the bankruptcy estate upon
conversion ... would automatically build a strange anomaly into the
Bankruptcy Code."'' 62 A holding that the 180 day clock for determining
property of the estate starts running on the date of filing would create an
incentive to all debtors who experience significant financial improvement
after filing under Chapter 13 to convert to Chapter 7 to avoid the
possibility of having to share their new found wealth with their creditors.
Congress certainly did not have such an intent. 63 An examination of
section 1329(a) indicates that Congress intended just the opposite. By
providing that a plan may be modified "upon request of the debtor, the
trustee, or the holder of an allowed unsecured claim"'64 to increase or
decrease payments, Congress intended that all parties involved in a
Chapter 13 proceeding would have an avenue to seek equitable relief in
160. As one court stated:
When he [the debtor] seeks to avoid the stigma of a Chapter 7 proceeding and selects a
Chapter 13 proceeding, he controls his destiny by submitting a plan consistent with his
financial situation....
After paying towards a confirmed plan and holding the creditors at bay, the debtor
should not be allowed to convert to Chapter 7 and further thwart the creditors who had
reasonable expectations to receive payments under the confirmed plan.
In re Halpenny, 125 B.R. 814, 816 (Bankr. Haw. 1991).
161. In re Brownlee, 93 B.R. 662, 666 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1988).
162. Robb v. Lybrook (In re Lybrook), 107 B.R. 611, 614 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989), aff'd, 135 B.R.
321 (N.D. Ind. 1990), af'd, 951 F.2d 136 (7th Cir. 1991).
163. Brief for Appellee at 12, In re Lybrook, 951 F.2d 136 (No. 90-2926).
164. 11 U.S.C. § 1329(a) (1988).
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the event of a change in the debtor's financial status. 6 Thus, Congress
must have intended that creditors be able to share in debtors' financial
improvement. 166
If debtors, by simply converting, were able to avoid the rigors of the
"best interest test," 1 67 or a required modification to a confirmed plan,
they would be able to retrieve for themselves the very property that
motivated the court's decision concerning the plan, and thus completely
escape compliance with the court's orders. "The Bankruptcy Code should
not be interpreted in a way that will facilitate such evasion."165
Debtors are not always prejudiced by the conclusion that the date of
conversion controls, since they may properly claim exemptions on that
date and preserve their interest in exemptible property. 69 Furthermore,
debtors' best interests arguably lie in defining the Chapter 7 estate as of
the date of conversion. For instance, where conversion occurs several
years after the date of filing, it would be unfair and impractical to hold
the debtor accountable for all the assets he held at the time of filing. For
example, the debtor may have had many accounts receivable at the time
of filing which were subsequently collected and the proceeds used to pay
for expenses during the pendency of the case. Debtors may be forced to
turn over thousands of dollars in assets for which they would be
responsible, but which were disposed of long before the conversion to
Chapter 7.170
There are other situations in which debtors can benefit from this rule.
For example, if between the time the debtor files under Chapter 13 and
the time he converts, the state changes its homestead exemption rule to
provide for a more generous exemption, the debtor would be entitled to
this exemption, even though it did not exist on the date of filing. This is
only fair since the new exemption will probably be a more accurate
reflection of the economic environment at the time of conversion. A
165. If the plan was not yet confirmed, debtors would also be encouraged to convert their case in
order to circumvent the "best interests of the creditors" test for plan confirmation under 11 U.S.C. §
1325(a)(4). See infra note 167 for details of the "best interests of the creditors" test.
166. Brief for Appellee at 12, In re Lybrook, 951 F.2d 136 (No. 90-2926).
167. One of the requirements that a Chapter 13 plan must meet before it will be confirmed is known
as the best interests of the creditors test: "the value.., of property to be distributed under the plan on
account of each allowed unsecured claim is not less than the amount that would be paid on such claim
if the estate of the debtor were liquidated under Chapter 7 of this title on such date." 11 U.S.C. §
1325(a)(4). This test is meant "to ensure that unsecured creditors would not be harmed by a debtor's
choice of Chapter 13 over Chapter 7." SOMMER, supra note 14, at 190.
168. Brief of Appellee at 12, In re Lybrook, 951 F.2d 136 (No. 90-2926).
169. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 1019(l)(A).
170. In re Lepper, 58 B.R. 896, 897 (Bankr. D. Md. 1986) (citing the trustee's brief).
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homestead exemption that was established many years earlier may be
outdated and insufficient to protect the debtor's interest. Allowing the
debtor to determine his exemptions on the date of conversion fulfills the
congressional policy of providing the debtor with a fresh start. 7 '
Given the arguments above, it is clear that the proposals suggesting that
property of the bankruptcy estate be determined as of the date of
conversion from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 are stronger than those that
suggest the date of the initial filing. Using the date of conversion is the
best way to take into account the changes in circumstance that led to the
debtor's decision to convert. It would be arbitrary and artificial to allow
the filing date of a failed Chapter 13 case to control what property is to
be included in a new Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Section 541 provides that the bankruptcy estate is composed of "all
legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the
commencement of the case.' 1 72 The problem of determining what
property is to be included in the bankruptcy estate after a conversion from
Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 comes down to the question of which date
controls "the commencement of the case"-the date of conversion or the.
date of filing. If the date of the initial Chapter 13 filing controls, then
only the property that the debtor owned on the date of filing his
Chapter 13 petition would come into the new Chapter 7 estate. Property
that the debtor acquired more than 180 days after filing, with a few
exceptions, 73 would be excluded from the new Chapter 7 estate, even
though it had been included under Chapter 13. If the date of conversion
controls, then all of the property that the debtor owned on the date of
conversion, including property acquired while the Chapter 13 plan was in
effect, would become property of the new Chapter 7 estate.
171. However, the court in In re Lepper was not persuaded by such arguments. "[T]he date of filing
the Chapter 13 petition is the relevant date for determining what constitutes property of the Chapter 7
estate upon conversion. If a debtor is unhappy with the result, that debtor has the opportunity to dismiss
the case and file a second petition .... Id. at 902. Presumably, at that time, the debtor would get to
claim all new exemptions.
172. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1988). In addition, the property of the estate also includes any interest
in inheritances, divorce settlements, and life insurance benefits that the debtor acquires or becomes
entitled to acquire within 180 days after the date of filing of the bankruptcy petition. Id. § 541(a)(5).
173. If acquired within 180 days of the Chapter 13 filing, property acquired by the following means
would be included: by bequest, devise, or inheritance; as a result of a property settlement agreement
with the debtor's spouse, or of an interlocutory or final divorce; or as a beneficiary of a life insurance
policy or of a death benefit plan. II U.S.C. § 541(a)(5).
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Currently, a great deal of judicial resources are being wasted on trying
to determine whether the date of filing or the date of conversion should
control which assets of the debtor become property of the estate. Courts
that have considered the problem have reached contradictory results.'7 4
There are numerous arguments, both statutory and policy based, to support
the use of either date. A strict reading of section 541 in isolation would
lead to the conclusion that the date of filing should control. However,
when interpreting the Code as a whole and taking into account the policies
behind the Code, it is clear that the date of conversion should control.
Furthermore, a trend seems to be developing at the appellate level
favoring the date of conversion over the date of filing. Although the lower
courts are still split on the issue, at least four appellate courts have
reached a consensus.
In In re Winchester,'75 the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth
Circuit held that the date of conversion from a Chapter 13 to a Chapter 7
bankruptcy determines the applicable exemptions which can be claimed in
the Chapter 7 estate. The Eighth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in
In re Lindberg,'76 holding that the date of conversion controls the
homestead exemption. In that case, the debtor was entitled to claim a
homestead exemption that was different from the one designated when the
Chapter 13 petition was filed. 177 As to the composition of the
bankruptcy estate, the Seventh Circuit held, in In re Lybrook,171 that the
date of conversion controls, and therefore after-acquired property is to be
included in the Chapter 7 estate. The Tenth Circuit recently agreed with
the Lybrook court's reasoning and held that all property acquired post-
petition and pre-conversion becomes property of the Chapter 7 estate.'
79
Under the current state of uncertainty, there is a danger that
unscrupulous debtors could attempt to twist the Bankruptcy Code to
benefit themselves at the expense of their creditors. The United States
Constitution grants Congress the sole power to determine the bankruptcy
laws. "The Congress shall have Power... To establish.., uniform Laws
on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States ... ,
174. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
175. Winchester v. Watson (In re Winchester), 46 B.R. 492 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1984).
176. Armstrong v. Lindberg (In re Lindberg), 735 F.2d 1087 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1073 (1984).
177. Id. at 1088.
178. Robb v. Lybrook (In re Lybrook), 951 F.2d 136 (7th Cir. 1991).
179. Calder v. Job (In re Calder), 973 F.2d 862 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 938 (1992).
180. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
[Vol. 68:489
POST-CONVERSION BANKRUPTCY ESTATE
Thus, Congress should take the initiative and settle the issue once and for
all.
The conundrum is to come up with a solution that does not interfere
with the congressional policy of encouraging debtors to choose Chapter 13
over Chapter 7, while at the same time preventing debtors from using
conversion from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 as a strategy for cheating
creditors. This is a difficult task to accomplish since part of the
attractiveness of Chapter 13 is the unlimited power to convert. This Note
proposes two alternative solutions to the problem of determining the
property of the converted bankruptcy estate which Congress may choose
to adopt and which bankruptcy courts may use to guide their decisions.
A. Proposal Number One:
Define the Relevant Date as the Date of Conversion
The first proposal is a simple one. Congress can amend the Bankruptcy
Code to make it clear that the date of conversion of the bankruptcy case
from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 is the relevant date for determining property
of the new Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate.
The amendment can be made in one of two ways. Section 541, which
defines property of the estate, can be amended to make it clear that
property of the estate includes "in a case that has been converted, all legal
or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the date of
conversion." In the alternative, section 348, which determines the effect
of conversion, can be amended as follows: "Property that the estate
acquires after the order for relief but before conversion in a case that is
converted shall be treated for all purposes as if such property had been
acquired by debtor immediately before the date of the filing of the
petition ......
The proposed amendment to section 348 is better than the proposed
amendment to section 541 for two reasons. First, it recognizes the
continuity of the bankruptcy estate from one chapter to another. Only that
property which became property of the estate under Chapter 13 would
become property of the converted estate under Chapter 7. In contrast, the
amendment to section 541 could bring in additional property that was not
property of the Chapter 13 estate. The Code should seek to maintain
continuity between the Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 estates, not to punish the
debtor for converting. Second, the section 348 amendment is preferable
to the section 541 amendment since section 348 is under the section
181. This amendment would be the companion of § 348(d), which treats claims against the estate
or the debtor that arise post-petition, but pre-conversion, as if they arose pre-petition.
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entitled "effect of conversion." This is the logical location for a rule that
explains the effect of conversion on the property of the estate.
1. Benefits of Proposal Number One
This proposal eliminates the problem of strategic conversions since
property of the estate will remain unchanged after conversion. There is no
longer the possibility of a retroactive exclusion of property from the
bankruptcy estate. This proposal also has the advantages of being
predictable and easy to apply. This black letter law makes clear to debtors
and creditors alike what the effect of conversion on the bankruptcy estate
would be. No longer will both sides have to present arguments trying to
persuade the court to look at one date or the other. No longer will the
outcome be based upon which judge happens to hear the case. Finally,
judicial resources will be saved by eliminating needless litigation
expenses, which will benefit not only the courts but also debtors and
creditors.
2. Potential Criticisms of Proposal Number One
There is a potential argument that this proposal is too broad because it
will affect all debtors who choose to convert, whether they convert for
legitimate reasons or with the intent to defraud their creditors. The mens
rea of the debtor, however, is not important; what is important is giving
creditors fair treatment. This is supported by section 1307, which provides
that a debtor may convert at any time. It does not require the debtor to
have a good reason. Furthermore, since proving the mens rea of a debtor
can be difficult, such a requirement would lead to a further drain on
limited resources.
Critics may also argue that making the date of conversion the relevant
date would discourage the use of Chapter 13. Under Chapter 13, the
debtor is required to pay all of his disposable income into a plan that may
last as long as five years." 2 It does not seem fair that the debtor, if he
converts, could also be required to give up anything that he may inherit
while the plan is in effect. If the debtor had originally filed under
Chapter 7, he would be able to keep his disposable income and his
inheritance," 3 but if he originally filed under Chapter 13 and then
182. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(1), (c) (1988).
183. Of course, this assumes that the debtor's right to the inheritance vested more than 180 days after
the filing. This is so because under Chapter 7 only the property that the debtor owns on the date of
filing and that which he inherits within 180 days after the date of filing come into the bankruptcy estate.
See 11 U.S.C. § 541. Under Chapter 13, however, there is no 180 day limit. Therefore, any inheritance
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converted to Chapter 7, he runs the risk of losing both. Debtors should be
encouraged to try Chapter 13, but under this rule the debtor would
actually' be punished for making the attempt. Therefore, the argument
goes, debtors will avoid Chapter 13 and go straight into Chapter 7.
This argument is tenuous at best. It is unlikely that debtors enter
Chapter 13 with the intent of converting to Chapter 7. Furthermore, the
only debtors who are harmed by this rule are those who receive new found
wealth, such as an inheritance, during the course of their Chapter 13 plan.
Thus, the only people who would be discouraged from attempting a
Chapter 13 would be those who believe there is a high probability that
they will receive a substantial inheritance in the near future. It seems
unlikely that a person who thought he was going to receive such wealth
would even be filing for bankruptcy.
Despite the potential drawbacks to the proposal of making the date of
conversion the relevant date, it is better than the alternative. If Congress
amends the Code to make the date that the debtor filed under Chapter 13
the relevant date for determining property of the bankruptcy estate, it
could lead to abuse of the bankruptcy system by debtors. Under such a
formulation, debtors would keep the advantages of Chapter 13'84 while
putting all the risk on creditors.' 85
B. Proposal Number Two:
Empower Courts to Limit Bad Faith Conversions
Since abuse of the bankruptcy system by debtors is the primary concern,
a logical solution would be to amend the Bankruptcy Code to discourage
"bad faith" conversions, eliminating the need to address the problem of
which date controls the composition of the Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate.
Courts should have the power to limit the ability to convert in cases where
the conversion would result in substantial abuse.
Under the current Bankruptcy Code, courts have no power to deny a
conversion since section 1307(a) states that the debtor may convert a case
under Chapter 13 to a case under Chapter 7 "at any time."' 86 Therefore,
the Code would have to be amended to give courts the power to deny a
conversion under certain circumstances. In the language of the Code, this
rule would appear as follows:
that the debtor receives while under Chapter 13 becomes part of the bankruptcy estate. See id. § 1306(a).
184. These advantages include, for example, the right to hold on to property and the greater
discharge available under Chapter 13.
185. The risk is that, by the time the Chapter 13 plan fails, the bankruptcy estate may be so depleted
that creditors end up getting less than they would have had the debtor originally filed under Chapter 7.
186. 11 U.S.C. § 1307(a).
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Notwithstanding section 1307(a), after notice and a hearing, the court,
on its own motion or on a motion by the United States Trustee, but not
at the request or suggestion of any party in interest, may deny a request
by a debtor to convert a case under chapter 13 to a case under
chapter 7 of this title if the court finds that the granting of the
conversion would be a substantial abuse of the provisions of this
chapter. There shall be a presumption in favor of granting the relief
requested by the debtor. 8 7
Under this rule, if the court finds that a conversion to Chapter 7 would
be an abuse of the Bankruptcy Code, it may deny the conversion. In order
to avoid excessive litigation, a motion to deny the conversion may be
made only by the bankruptcy court or the United States Trustee. Creditors
may not make the motion. If the court suspects abuse, it should look at all
of the facts and circumstances surrounding the conversion. The court may
consider a number of factors in deciding whether to deny a conversion:
whether distributions to creditors under the new Chapter 7 plan would be
substantially less than the payments they would have received under the
Chapter 13 plan; whether the debtor has acquired new found wealth during
the Chapter 13 plan; whether the assets of the original Chapter 13 estate
are still substantially intact; whether the debtor entered into the
Chapter 13 plan with a good faith intention of completing it; 88 and
whether the conversion is for reasons beyond the debtor's control.' If
the dominant purpose of the conversion is to cheat creditors out of a share
of the debtor's new found wealth, the conversion should be denied.
Of course, there should be a presumption in favor of allowing the
conversion, and the burden of proof should be on the court or the trustee
to show bad faith. Creditors should be provided notice of the court's
investigation and have a full opportunity to be heard on the issue.
1. Benefits of Proposal Number Two
This proposed rule would have the effect of frustrating those debtors
who would try to abuse the Bankruptcy Code for their own benefit, while
still keeping the liberal provisions of Chapter 13 intact. The advantage of
this rule is that it would, unlike a blanket rule using date of conversion
187. The language of this proposed amendment is similar to the language in I1 U.S.C. § 707(b),
which gives the bankruptcy court the power to dismiss a consumer debtor's Chapter 7 case if the court
finds that the granting of relief (i.e., permitting liquidation) would be an abuse -of Chapter 7.
188. Some may argue that the conversion itself is per se evidence of bad faith; however, such a
holding goes against public policy. Congress wanted to encourage Chapter 13 filings, and among the
benefits of Chapter 13 is the right to convert the case at any time. Therefore, the debtor should receive
a presumption of good faith.
189. This list of factors is by no means exhaustive.
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as the date for determining property of the estate, only affect dishonest
debtors. The honest debtor is still free to explore all of his options. Thus,
honest debtors will not be discouraged from attempting a Chapter 13 plan
since they know that if it is not successful they will always have the
option of converting to Chapter 7 without any penalty.
2. Potential Criticisms of Proposal Number Two
One potential criticism of this rule is that, because the debtor's
cooperation is needed in order for a Chapter 13 plan to work, it would be
impracticable to keep a debtor in a Chapter 13 plan against his wishes.
Chapter 13 requires a debtor to have "regular income." 9 If the debtor
no longer liked the idea of all of his disposable income going to his
creditors, he could simply quit his job or refuse to go to work, thereby
reducing his disposable income to zero. Since the United States
Constitution prohibits involuntary servitude, 9' the court could not force
the debtor to continue working for the benefit of his creditors. Thus, the
uncooperative debtor would be able to frustrate the plan.
This proposed rule, however, does not force the debtor to stay in
Chapter 13 until it is completed; it merely forbids the dishonest debtor
from converting to Chapter 7. The dishonest debtor is still free to dismiss
his Chapter 13 case under section 1307(b) and refile under Chapter 7.'92
However, doing so would probably not be a wise decision on the debtor's
part because dismissing and refiling creates a whole new bankruptcy case,
thereby changing the date upon which property of the estate is determined.
The property of the Chapter 7 estate is determined "as of the
commencement of the case. '"'9 3 Therefore, property of the new Chapter 7
case would be determined on the date that the Chapter 7 petition was
filed. 194 Consequently, all nonexempt property that the debtor owns on
the date of the new Chapter 7 filing, including his new found wealth,
would become property of the Chapter 7 estate and be liquidated for the
benefit of the creditors.' 95 In sum, instead of dismissing the Chapter 13
190. "Only an individual with regular income that owes, on the date of the filing of the petition,
noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured debts of less than $100,000 and noncontingent, liquidated, secured
debts of less than $350,000 ... may be a debtor under chapter 13 of this title." 11 U.S.C. § 109(e)
(1988) (emphasis added).
191. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIII, § 1.
192. Likewise, if the debtor is uncooperative, the court can dismiss the Chapter 13 case.
193. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1).
194. A voluntary bankruptcy case is "commenced" by filing a petition with the bankruptcy court.
Id. § 303.
195. For a discussion concerning the difference between conversion and dismissal, see supra notes
112-19 and accompanying text.
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claim and refiling under Chapter 7, it is probably in the debtor's best
interests to modify the Chapter 13 plan to take into account the new found
wealth and to continue making payments under the plan.
Critics will charge that because this amendment puts a limitation on
conversion it could theoretically discourage debtors from choosing
Chapter 13. One way to encourage debtors to give Chapter 13 a try is to
provide them with an escape route: if for any reason at any time a debtor
is not completely satisfied with his Chapter 13 plan, he has the
unconditional right to convert to Chapter 7 with no questions asked. This
is currently accomplished through section 1307, which gives Chapter 13
debtors an unlimited ability to convert. In contrast, limiting the ability to
convert would make trying Chapter 13 riskier and less appealing to the
debtor.
This argument is weak for two reasons. First, it is highly unlikely that
the average debtor actually takes into account future strategies, such as
converting from one chapter to another, when he is choosing which
chapter to initially file under. 96 Further, the only debtors who need to
fear this amendment (and thus be potentially deterred from choosing
Chapter 13) are those who plan to convert in bad faith-that is, with the
intent to harm their creditors.
The biggest disadvantage of this rule, when compared to the current
black letter rules in bankruptcy, is the absence of a bright line for
determining what constitutes "substantial abuse." To be sure, this rule
would require a fact specific inquiry, which could lead to longer and more
expensive bankruptcy proceedings.'9 7 Whether the added cost will be
outweighed by the increase in fairness to all parties to the bankruptcy
remains to be seen.
CONCLUSION
Of the two alternative solutions proposed by this Note, the first is
preferable to the second. The second alternative is not as definite and
therefore may lead to more court time being wasted. The first solution is
196. This is true for a number of reasons. For example, the debtor filing for bankruptcy obviously
does not have much money, and therefore cannot afford much legal advice-particularly with respect
to hypothetical questions such as "What happens if I inherit a large sum of money?" Furthermore, a
debtor who believes he may be acquiring new found wealth would probably not file for personal
bankruptcy in the first place.
197. An advantage of simple bankruptcy rules is the savings in time and money for the courts and
the parties involved. A study of the amount of time it takes for a judge to dispose of bankruptcy cases
indicates that a Chapter 7 nonbusiness case with scheduled debts of less than $50,000 requires 11.4
minutes of a judge's time; a Chapter 13 case with scheduled debts of less than $50,000 requires 47.4
minutes of a judge's time. JOHN E. SHAPARD, THE 1981 BANKRUPTCY COURT TIME STuDY 36 (1982).
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a simple black letter rule which will cut down on much confusion and lead
to greater predictability and uniformity. Furthermore, there is less of a
chance that the first alternative will discourage debtors from choosing
Chapter 13 since it preserves the unlimited right to convert, which is
arguably one of the factors that induces debtors to try Chapter 13 in the
first place.
Until Congress acts, the courts should be guided by the principles
underlying the Bankruptcy Code, namely allowing the honest but
unfortunate debtor to obtain a fresh start. Almost as important as insuring
that the honest debtor receives a fresh start is preventing the dishonest
debtor from violating the spirit of the law by exploiting loopholes in the
Code. Congress, as well as the courts, should seek to "discourage strategic
and opportunistic behavior that hurts creditors without advancing any
legitimate interest of debtors." '198
198. In re Lybrook, 951 F.2d 136, 137 (7th Cir. 1991).
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